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Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100030003-1

Chief, Staff Intelligence Group,
Projects Planning
Chief, Transportation Group, ORE

3 October 1949

Financial structure and organization of Civil Air Transport

The following report is submitted in response to Project IP-23, dated September 30, 1949.

Civil Air Transport (CAT) initiated operations on Feb. 3, 1947 under an arrangement by which it was to give top priority to movement of cargo and passengers for CNRRA (Chinese National Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Administration).

Upon termination of the agreement with CNRRA, CAT was allowed to operate as a non-scheduled carrier in all areas of China, *by the Chinese Government*

CAT Enterprises

(1) CAT is a shareholder in JAMCO, a maintenance company operated by Jardine Matheson Company at Hong Kong. When CAT was forced to give up its maintenance and administrative base at Canton it was given office space at Kai Tak airfield by JAMCO.

(2) The International Supply Company is a subsidiary of, and entirely owned by CAT. It was organized in the United States in 1946 and the head office was located in Shanghai.

Board of Governors

L. K. Taylor - American
R. F. Scariano - American
H. D. Redger - American

H. L. Harris - Canadian
C. W. Bayden - British
W. S. Wang - Chinese

Taylor is a minority stockholder in CAT but a majority stockholder in ISC.

Shipments of arms and ammunition were made by the Company to the Moslem Generals in the Northwest. The equipment was allotted by the Nationalist Government. However, the two generals were interested in setting up an import-export arrangement to provide foreign exchange for additional arms. The Company also acted as liaison agent for the Mas to such organisations as ECA for power plant and other equipment. *with*

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SECRET

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(3) A light plane feeder service by CAT operated with Lanchow as its headquarters serviced an area approximately 350 miles in diameter on a charter basis. Equipment consisted of four Cessna 195 aircraft. Flights were entirely on a charter basis.

(4) CAT and Societe Indochinoise de Transport Aeriens (SITA) concluded a working agreement in regard to the Mengtze-Haiphong tin shuttle.

Each airline agreed to airlift 50% of the 11,000 tons of tin from Mengtze, Yunnan Province to Haiphong, French Indo-China.

SITA, using 3 Bristol a/c to CAT's 10 C-46 a/c and unable to fly its share reserved the right to charter CAT planes to fulfill its share of the contract. On the return trip CAT flies aviation gas to Mengtze where they stockpile it.

Present Financial Structure of C.A.T.

(#) Ownership.

The original \$250,000 U.S. which started CAT was said to have been furnished by Yuen Ling Wang, a member of the board of directors.

Stock ownership - C. L. Chennault)	
Whiting Willauer)	67.32 percent
L. K. Taylor)	

Chinese Partners -	32.68 percent
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Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100030003-1

-3-

A break-down in greater detail is as follows:

<u>Owner</u>	<u>Approximate Percentage</u>
C. L. Chennault	26.93
Whiting Willauer	26.93
L. K. Taylor	10.95
Wang Wen-san	2.50
Y. L. Wang	12.72
K. M. Hsu	4.95
Yunnan Peoples Development Corp.	7.00
Shansi Civil Enterprise Board	5.00
T. M. Tai	1.00
L. K. Ying	1.00
K. Y. Chen	1.00
	<u>100.00</u>

(3) Board of Directors

C. L. Chennault, President and Chief of Operations
 Whiting Willauer, Vice President
 Eric Taylor
 Yuen Ling Wang
 Wen San Wang, Chairman of Board of Directors.

(4) Details of the corporate charter.

CAT was incorporated in China as a Sino-American enterprise and granted a one-year franchise by the Chinese Government. The 1948 agreement was between the Civil Aeronautics Administration of the Ministry of Communications and C. L. Chennault and Whiting Willauer, representatives of a co-partnership doing business in China under the name of Civil Air Transport.

The operations contract gave CAT permission to operate until 31 December 1948 after which date the continuance of CAT was to be decided in accordance with the policy of the Government of China.

The Shanghai Military Control Commission (SMCC) ordered the dissolution of CAT in Shanghai in August 1949, on the grounds that CAT planes had bombed Communist forces and transported Nationalist troops and military supplies.

CAT moved its base of operations from Shanghai to Canton, then in turn to Ningning and Haiphong to keep ahead of the Communists' advances. An LST for repair shops and a barge for a storage warehouse made the latter moves possible. General Chennault has declared his opposition to doing any business with the Chinese Communists.

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Memorandum To: Chief, Staff Intelligence Group

30 Sept 1949

Subject : Request for Information

1. Information is requested concerning the present financial structure of Chennault's airline (C.A.T.). Specifically, the following is required:

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- b. Ownership
 - c. Board of Directors
 - d. Details of the corporate charter

2. We would appreciate it if this data were available by 1600 hours, 3 October.

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


Intelligence Support, OPC

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G/SI
Pls. return letter to G/SI

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SECRET

WJM

Project: ²⁴IP-28

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project: Units Action Memorandum

Date: 3 Oct 49

To: D/NE

From: Staff Intelligence ^{Division} ~~XXXXX~~ Projects Planning REL

Subject: Attitudes of Iranian tribes

Statement of Project

Origin: Special

Problem: To provide a brief summary of certain attitudes of Iranian tribes

Assumptions:

Following points to be covered:

Scope:

1. Loyalty to established government (Shah)
2. Attitude toward Iranian Army
3. Attitude toward Constabulary
4. Attitude toward communism
5. Religious affiliations or leanings

Classification to be no higher than: Top Secret

Form: Memorandum

Date: To D/St by 1200 on 10 October 1949

Branch responsibility: To prepare finished memorandum; consultation with D/EE if necessary on point 4, above.

Departmental responsibility: None

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

*Delayed - Conference
between NE & OPC
will be in 1 Nov.*

Rec'd & Rel. 10/27/49

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Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100030003-1

3 October 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: 25X1A
SUBJECT : Information on Iranian Tribes

1. A brief summary is desired on the following points regarding Iranian tribes:

- a. Their loyalty to the established government (Shah).
- b. Attitude toward Iranian Army.
- c. Attitude toward the Constabulary.
- d. Attitude toward Communism.
- e. Religious affiliations on learnings.

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Chief, Intelligence Research

Reference: Case No. 380

10 Oct 1949

Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100030003-1

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<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center;"> <div style="font-size: 2em; font-family: cursive;">P-24</div> <div> <p>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY</p> <p>OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</p> </div> </div>			
TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	25X1A		
2	<div style="background-color: black; width: 100px; height: 40px;"></div>		
3			
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	DAD/ORE		5 Oct
2			
3			
<div style="display: grid; grid-template-columns: 1fr 1fr 1fr; gap: 5px;"> <div><input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> ACTION</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> RETURN</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> FILE</div> </div> <p>REMARKS: <i>Noted and returned per your request. Thank you.</i></p>			

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		
TO:		DATE
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	
REMARKS:		
<p>For DAD/ORE</p> <p>Please return to</p> <p>D/St.</p> <p>OCT 3 1949 AD-22</p>		
FROM:		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
FORM NO. 36-8 SEP 1946		

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The tribes of Iran number about 3 million—possibly considerably more—out of a total population of 16 million. Some of the tribal federations or groups—in most areas a number of tribes are grouped into rather loosely knit federations—are of very ancient stock and in time of national war have furnished hardy fighting contingents as well as a number of warrior-rulers of Iran. For a number of centuries they have carried on a life of vertical nomadism—moving between warm plains and high mountain valleys as the seasons change. A considerable proportion of the total number has become semi-sedentary or sedentary. Between 1925-40 the Iranian government made strenuous efforts to settle certain groups in villages but this effort failed, primarily because Iran has not sufficient irrigated farm land and the tribes must continue to rely upon their vast flocks to furnish their basic needs.

The tribes tend to remain apart from the rest of the population and to continue their distrust of the army and of the government which taxes them and takes conscripts without returning tangible benefits. Tribal disorders, ranging from highway robbery to armed revolt, have been common enough in the past when the government has frequently taken very harsh measures to restore order. Upon the Allied occupation of Iran in 1941 certain of the tribes were able to acquire considerable stocks of arms from the dispersing Iranian army. After 1943 the re-organized army began its efforts to collect arms from the tribes and aroused considerable ill will. Then in 1945 and 1946 the successive incidents of the regime of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, the establishment of the Kurdish Peoples Republic, the Qashqai revolt, and the incipient Bakhtiari revolt led the Iranian political

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

and military leaders to review their policy toward the tribes. A new policy* aimed at conciliation, indoctrination against foreign influences and training for resistance in case of foreign invasion was gradually introduced. By 1948 the Iranian army had this new policy in force and in 1949 only a single minor skirmish between army and tribal elements occurred throughout the country.

While tribal elements are scattered throughout the country, the greatest concentration is in the Zagros mountains and the extension of this range--in northwestern, western and southwestern Iran. Thus, in Azerbaijan, the main Zagros and the less rugged terrain ^{and below} at the head of the Persian Gulf are tribes whose martial spirit, trackless habitat and habits of independence might make them the backbone of a campaign designed to harass invaders of Iran. Within this zone are these important federations: Shahsevan, Kurd, Lur, Bakhtiari, ^{Kuh Galu} Boer-Ahmad, Mamassani, Qashqai, Khansech, Arab and ^{Bamadi} ~~Bamadi~~.

In the later paragraphs the attitudes of these tribes are given under the following subjects:

1. Loyalty to established government (Shan)
2. Attitude toward Iranian army
3. Attitude toward Constabulary
4. Attitude toward Communism
5. Religious affiliations or leanings

In attempting to estimate the attitude of tribes in relation to the points under consideration it is important to keep the following in mind:

1. The tribes of Iran, with the possible exception of the Qashqais, are composed of many tribal groups having no common leadership,

* For a comprehensive treatment of this policy see: Am.Emb. Tehran, Despatch 300, "Iranian Government's New Tribal Policy", 13 Oct. 1948, Confidential.

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

lack cohesion and are subject to strife among themselves.

2. The army's policy of winning the cooperation of the tribes, which must still be regarded as only a temporary expediency, has been in effect less than two years, too short a period to eradicate the bitterness engendered by Reza Shah's twenty year long efforts of ruthless subjugation. Moreover, the degree of success of the new policy among the different tribal elements undoubtedly varies considerably according to: (1) the depth of the animosity and suspicion of each respective tribal group toward the government and the army and (2) the manner in which the policy is being carried out currently by local commanders in the different areas. For example the Papi Lurs, having cooperated with the government over a number of years for tactical reasons will undoubtedly respond to the policy more readily than the Baranwand Lurs, who have resisted and suffered severely at the hands of the army. The success of the new policy also depends in a measure on internal tribal differences, such as exist among the Boir Ahandi of the Kuh Galu, and the ability of the army to resolve these differences in an equitable manner. Another important factor, is the degree of authority of the chief over his tribes. Important sections of several tribes i.e. the Baranwand Lurs, have not been under control of their chiefs, and have formed themselves into strong unruly bands--generally known as outlaws. In other cases tribes have been left without any real leaders due to the liquidation of all of their principal chiefs. In still other cases through manipulations on the part of the army unwanted leaders have been imposed upon the tribes.

3. While the loyalty of the tribes to the Iranian Government is for the most part questionable, on several occasions tribal elements have displayed faithful relations to foreigners: (1) the Bakhtiari to the British;

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(2) the Qashqai and Tangistani to the Germans (Wassmus in World War I, German agents in World War II); (3) the Lurs and Khuzistan Arabs to Americans during the location and construction of the Transiranian railway in 1928-31 and again during World War II.

4. Information currently available is generally not sufficiently reliable, specific and recent to permit really accurate estimates*.

* This is particularly true with regard to the gendarmerie (Constabulary). In the summer of 1949 three-quarters of this force was taken under the Ministry of War and the limited numbers that remain under the Ministry of Interior will certainly operate in a different fashion than in the past so that former judgements of relations between gendarmerie and tribes must be disregarded. It is also true now as in the past that the gendarmerie has closer relations with the farming communities than with the tribesmen in that gendarmerie posts are located either on motorable routes or upon the periphery of rugged tribal terrain.

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1.

SHAHSEVAN

1. Very good
2. Very good
3. No information: probably good
4. Leaders very anti-communist
5. Sunni Moslem

Habitat: The eastern half of the province of Azerbaijan, adjacent to the Soviet frontier.

Origin: A group of elements of Turki origin brought together in the early XVIIth century by Shah Abbas as a ^{martial} ~~material~~ group capable of maintaining order in the region and of contributing forces to the army. At that time given the name which means "Shah-lovers" the federation has been loyal to the government ever since.

Tribal Division: The Shahsevan number not more than 130,000 individuals. Of a considerable number of tribes, the principle ones are the Moghan, the Ardabili and the Khalkhali. The three leading chiefs Amir Aslan Khan Isalu, Fazelollah Tales Mikaelu and the Hatam Khan Killu are reportedly in conflict with each other.

General: In 1946 the Shahsevans waged active guerilla warfare against the autonomous regime in Azerbaijan. In 1948 or early 1949 some 2,000 tribesmen were equipped by the Iranian army with rifles and horses and are employed to resist border crossings and assaults from the USSR. The Iranian CO in this area states that he could arm up to 10,000 men who would supply their own horses. The Shah has stated that he places greatest confidence among the ~~Shahsevans~~ in the Shahsevans.

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Here 1. Two smaller federations live adjacent to the Shahsevans. On the west the Qaradaghi, athwart the road from Julfa on the Irane-Soviet frontier to Tabris, are not of conspicuous importance. South of the Shahsevan and along the Zanjan-Tabris road are the Zelfagari who were extremely active in harassing outposts of the autonomous regime in Azerbaijan. Their loyalty to the government is very good.

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KURDS

A. Northern Kurds

1. Variable: from good to fair
2. Variable: from good to fair
3. No information
4. Largely anti-Soviet (see below).
5. Sunni Moslems, but with a sketchy indoctrination.

Habitat: East of Lake Rezayieh, from the extreme northwest corner of Iran south to Baqqiz and Sanandaj.

Origin: Known to have lived in the region in pre-Christian times. Their language is based on old Persian, but local dialects vary greatly.

Tribal divisions: Jalali, Shikkak, Debukri, Begzadeh, Herki, Mukri, Milani and others. [REDACTED] the 25X1X Shikkak have 4,270 rifles, the Jalali 4,280 rifles and the Herki, Begzadeh and Debukri each between 300 and 400.

General: The martial Kurds, distributed over a part of Iran, Iraq and Turkey, have frequently caused serious trouble to the Iranian government and between 1930 and 1940 the Iranian army carried out rather extensive but inconclusive operations against them. A more recent potential source of difficulty has been local and international agitation for a Kurdish National State.

In 1945 the establishment of an autonomous regime by the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan was followed by the creation of a Kurdish Peoples Republic centered at Mahabad, south of Lake Rezayieh. This "Republic" collapsed before Iranian troops in December 1946 and a number of its leaders were put to death by the government.

Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP80-01049A000100030003-1

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100030003-1

- 8 -

The most influential chief of the Northern Kurds is Ammar Khan Shikkak. In 1946 he collaborated with the K.P.R. but later withdrew his support. His influence is strong over the Herki and Jalali as well as over his own Shikkak and it is believed that some 30,000 northern Kurds might follow his orders. In the spring of 1949 he was a member of the Constituent Assembly and the Iranian government now appears to have confidence in him. Next in influence are the Ilkhanizadeh brothers of the Debukri tribe. They refused to join the K.P.R. and have always cooperated with the government. The Jalali, Begzadeh and Milani were formerly the most receptive to pro-Soviet propaganda but the closing of Soviet consulates at Maku and Rezayish in 1949 shut off good channels of propaganda and influence. One of the Jalali leaders, Hasan Agha, is considered anti-Soviet, while another, Omar Agha, is thought to be pro-Soviet.

In general, most of the northern Kurds were disillusioned by their experiences under the Soviet occupation of 1942-46. While not wholly satisfied with their present treatment, they will remain loyal if the Iranian army does not attempt to disarm them, to expropriate their lands and to otherwise oppress them. In 1949 they appeared apathetic toward the idea of a Kurdish National State.

B. Southern Kurds

1. Good
2. Good
3. No information
4. Leaders are all anti-Soviet (see below)
5. Mostly Sunni Moslems, somewhat more orthodox

SECRET

Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100030003-1

SECRET

- 9 -

Habitat: South of Sanandaj to Kermanshah and Gilan and west of Kermanshah to the Iran-Iraq border.

Origin: As for Northern Kurds, except more intermixed.

Tribal divisions: Kalhur, Avromani, Mangur, Banah, Qurani, etc.

General: A large measure of authority is wielded over these tribes by the important Ardalan, Qobadian, Zanganeh and Asef families. The families themselves have become thoroughly urbanized and are represented at Tehran by high government officials, by members of the Majlis and, upon occasion, by a cabinet minister. The head of the very important Kalhur tribe of nearly 12,000 families is Abbas Qobadian. Imprisoned by Reza Shah for nearly ten years, he later was elected to the XIVth and XVth Majlis and demonstrated, by his speeches, that he was on excellent terms with General Razmara and the government. The Ardalan family has consistently asserted the loyalty of the southern Kurds. British influence among these tribes has been strong and they have been little penetrated by Soviet propaganda.

SECRET

SECRET
- 10 -

LUR

1. Variable: good to indifferent.
2. Variable: good to indifferent.
3. No information
4. Anti-communist
5. Shia Moslem, not very orthodox

Habitat: In the Pusht-i-Kuh and Pish-i-Kuh regions--south of the Kurds, north of the Bakhtiari and west of the town of Khorramabad to the Iran-Iraq frontier.

Origin: Settled in the region for many centuries. Speak Luri, related to Old Persian.

Tribal divisions: Very numerous divisions and sub-divisions with a possible total of 300,000 individuals. Not united and apparently lack conspicuous leaders. Pusht-i-Kuh tribes adjacent to the Iran-Iraq frontier less turbulent than those of Pish-i-Kuh. All have reputation for thievery, dishonesty and other unattractive characteristics.

General: The Papi, Lower Sagwand and a few other tribes have shown a willingness to cooperate with the government, while many others are exceedingly suspicious of the intentions of the Iranian government and army, due largely to the punitive campaigns against them during the reign of Reza Shah.

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BAKHTIARI

1. Good
2. Fairly good
3. No information
4. Most of the leaders are anti-communist (see below)
5. Shia Moslems.

Habitat: In the Zagros mountains, west and south of Isfahan, as far south as Dizful.

Origin: Frequently thought to be of same stock as the Lurs and may be a Lur splinter group of recent date.

Tribal division: Two major groupings of tribes; the Haft Lang and the Chahar Lang--the former predominant since the middle of the XIXth century. After that time a family of the Bakhtiarvand tribe of the Haft Lang held control but about 1880 rifts developed between brothers and the family split into two lines called the Il Khani and the Hajji Il Khani. Since that date rivalry between these lines has been more intense than between the Haft Lang and Chahar Lang proper. The group of tribes displays no present unity of purpose or action. Certain leaders promote their own factions but divisions are so sharp that the southeastern Bakhtiaris are looking to the Qashqais for leadership.

Currently important leaders include the following:

Morteza Goli Khan Sassan (IlKhani): elderly, considered the most pro-British of the leaders. In 1941 was governor of the Bakhtiaris and later governor of Shahr-i-Kurd. The father of

SECRET

SECRET
- 12 -

Jehanshah and three other sons.

Jehanshah Samsam (Il Khani): reportedly the most influential leader. Involved in incipient 1946 Bakhtiari revolt and arrested and briefly held by the Iranian government. In March 1949 named governor general of Kurdistan. Reputedly anti-Soviet.

Amir Hosein Zafari (Il Khani): brother (?) of Morteza Goli Khan. Oxford educated and former tennis star. Conservative in politics; a supporter of Sayyid Zia ad din Tabatabai and then of Mulla Kashani. Deputy to the XVth Majlis from Shahr-i-Kurd.

Abol Qasem (Hajji Il Khani): Heads the faction rival to the Il Khani line. Governor of the Bakhtiari in 1946 and co-governor in 1947. Revealed plot for 1946 Bakhtiari revolt to government and in 1947 was alleged to be in touch with Soviet agents and Tudeh party.

General: The British representatives in Iran have always been close to the Bakhtiari while the Anglo Iranian Oil Company has cultivated intimate relations as a means of protecting and policing their oil fields in the tribal area. According to one of the Qashqai leaders, the Bakhtiari have become soft and would be of little value in any emergency.

SECRET

SECRET

- 13 -

KDE GALU

1. No information, possibly fair
2. No information, possibly good to fair.
3. No information
4. No information, but may be assumed to be anti-communist
5. Shia Moslem, not very orthodox

Habitat: Inland and to the northeast of the head of the Persian Gulf, with Arab tribes to the west, Bakhtiari and Mamassani to the north and Qashqai to west and south.

Origin: Are generally classed as Lurs and speak a Luri dialect or a mixture of Luri and Persian.

Tribal division: Possibly 35,000 individuals in two principal groups, the Chahar Banicheh and the Liravi, each with a number of sub-tribes.

General: The sedentary sections are generally peaceful while the nomadic branches have been notoriously lawless, particularly the Boer Ahmadi, led by Abdulla Zarghampur. Currently the Iranian army is making a considerable effort to win over these tribes and according to the CO, Shiraz Division, the Boer Ahmadi are not only bold fighters but would be loyal to Iran in case of a foreign invasion.

SECRET

SECRET

MANASSANI

1. No information
2. No information
3. No information
4. No information
5. Shia Moslems of an orthodox character

Habitat: Between the villages of Ardaken, Kazeran and Shapur.

Origin: Named after the tribal founder--Mohammad Hassani.

Apparently collected in the region in fairly recent time from groups coming from Khuzistan and Pusht-i-Kuh. Speak a dialect which is close to colloquial Persian.

Tribal division: Bakash, Javidi, Doshman Zleri and Rustan with, according to different estimates, from 20,000 to 45,000 individuals. Possess some 3,000 rifles. Mostly sedentary, but of martial spirit.

General: Very little seems to be known about this federation which is sometimes considered as a tribe of the Kuh Galu. Possibly dominated by the Qashqais. Believed to be incapable of troubling security. Nothing known of their leaders beyond their names.

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SECRET

(15)

QASHQAI

1. Very good - at present
2. Good - at present
3. No information - probably good
4. Leaders are strongly anti-communist
5. Shia Moslems and, for tribesmen, rather orthodox.

Habitat: West of Shiraz, from Firuzabad vicinity far north to Abadeh.
Conduct longest migration of any tribe.

Origin: Of Turkish stock. Long settled in the area. Speak Turki.

Tribal division: A very large number of tribes. One very good source estimates the total number at 100,000, while another reputable source says 256,000 individuals. Possess at least 12,000 rifles and a few machine guns and mortars. Leaders are five fairly young, intelligent, active, political-minded brothers: Malik Mansur, Nasr Khan, Mohammad Hosein, Khosrow and Amir Mohammad.

General: Traditionally hostile to the British, to the Khansah federation and to the Lur tribes of their region. The most powerful federation in Iran with the strongest leaders. For many years mistrustful of the Iranian government and in 1943 and 1946 defeated elements of the Iranian army. Still rather suspicious of the Shah and of General Razmara, the leaders have apparently decided on complete cooperation with the government in an anti-Soviet program.

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(16)

KHAMSEH

1. Little information. Probably good as have long been calm under pro-government Qavam family of Shiraz, and more recently under military governors.
2. No information. Possibly good.
3. No information
4. No information
5. Most are Shia Moslems.

Habitat: Some distance to the east of Shiraz and north, south and east of Lake Meirin.

Origin: Apparently the Iranian government encouraged the establishment of this federation during the XIXth century. For many years it was ~~has~~ under the leadership of an elder member of the powerful Qavam family of Shiraz.

Tribal division: Ainanlu, Baharlu, Arab, Baseri and Nefar. Population figures have been given which vary from 60,000 total to that of 32,500 families (162,500). Members of the largest tribe, the Arab, speak Arabic mixed with Persian and Turki words, while the other tribes are of Turkish stock.

Allegedly surrendered all their rifles between 1945 and the present but may have 1,000 or more at this time.

General: This group of tribes does not appear to be particularly close knit nor to have important local leaders. Members of the federation are not generally martial in spirit. Bad feeling has existed between the Khamseh and the Qashqai and was in evidence as late as 1948 when a Khamseh, Arab

Shalibani, defeated a Qashqai in elections for the Meirin. No current or past information as to the role of the Qavam family is available.

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ARAB

1. No information: probably good to fair
2. No information: probably good to fair
3. No information
4. Anti-communist
5. Shia Moslem, of orthodox character

Habitat: the plains of Khuzistan, to the north of the head of the Persian Gulf.

Origin: Largely derived from Arabic speaking tribes which are known to have entered the region from the west.

Tribal Division: Some eight large tribes and many smaller ones. Both nomadic and sedentary, totalling some 250,000.

General: The region of Khuzistan was semi-independent of Iran until brought under strict control by Reza Shah in 1925. Since that date these tribes have been treated with indifference by the Iranian government, while suffering a certain amount of ill treatment at the hands of the army and gendarmerie. Living in an exposed situation on the plains, there is little chance of their making serious difficulties for the army or government of Iran and given fair treatment they would certainly cooperate with the government. Little information is available concerning the present attitude of the government toward them. In the serious AIOC labor riots of 1946 the tribes nearest Khorramshar showed themselves to be definitely anti-communist.

SECRET

SECRET

(18)

BANADIR

1. No information
2. No information
3. No information
4. No information
5. Probably Shia Moslem.

Habitat: The coastal plains of the Persian Gulf and inland through the foothills, from below the head of the Gulf down past Bushire and as far as the port of Lingeh.

Origin: Too varied for specific comment

Tribal division Include a number of apparently unrelated tribes which are briefly listed in major groups as they occur from below the head of the Gulf to the southeast. The Dashtestan, of Lur stock, number some 5,000 and are found inland from Bushire and to the northwest of Bushire toward the head of the Gulf. The Tangestani, of Lur stock, number some 2,700 and are found to the southeast of Bushire. The Dashti, of Lur stock, number some 5,000 and are found inland and along the coast to the southeast of the Tangestani. The Aleh Nassur are of Arab stock, number some 1,750, and are found along the coast, below the Dashti, in a section which includes the minor ports of Kanagan and Taheri. Taheri is the seat of the Sahykh of Taheri who is active in the smuggling trade.

General: Practically no information is available on these tribes who are of importance as they occupy the small but active smuggling ports on the Gulf. It is not believed that they are strong enough to cause trouble to the government. Their loyalty to government is probably limited.

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[illegible]

Antimony - China

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[illegible]

(1)	(2)	(4)	(6)	(9)
<u>Korea - cont.</u>				
Pai-poh	Yang-chang		2900	
Wu-lung	Tu-shan		3000	
<u>Yunnan</u>				
Yu-chia-tu-chang	Ping-i		28000	
Kuo-yuan	Wu-shan		20000	
Hu-tu	Ping-pien			
<u>Kuanyai</u>				
Pu-ping-chang	Bo-chih	Wu-shan	Wu-shan	(m) 1000
Lu-Pang	Ru-yang	Wu-shan	Wu-shan	
Tu-chang	Wu-shan	Wu-shan	Wu-shan	

Burma, Siam, Indo China, Korea and India also produce antimony with several scattered deposits occurring in each country. These are small and relatively insignificant in the world picture.

1P-25

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Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: 19 Oct 49

To: D/Es

From: ~~State Intelligence Division, Projects Planning~~
~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Subject: Tin and antimony mines in China

Statement of ProjectOrigin: SpecialProblem: To report the latest available information on current production in tin and antimony mines in ChinaScope: Geographically, the paper should cover all China, including Taiwan and Hainan.Information should give location and current production for tin and antimony.Graphics (if any):Form: Smooth memorandum, for transmittal by D/Pub.Draft due in D/Est: 1200 21 Oct 1949Dissemination deadline 1700 21 Oct
(if any):Responsible Branch: D/EsInternal Coordination: Coordinate with D/FEDepartmental responsibilities: NoneClassification to be no higher than: Top SecretRecommended Dissemination: Requester only

~~SECRET~~

1P-26

18 October 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, G/SI

SUBJECT : Request for Information - Case No. 459

1. It is requested that this office be provided with current information concerning the following:

a. Location and current production of tin and antimony mines in China, including Taiwan and Hainan Islands.

2. It would be appreciated if this data were made available by 21 October.

25X1A



Intelligence Support, OPC

REL
19 Oct 49

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

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P-25

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

25X1A

ACCESSION NO.

DATE RECEIVED IN S. A.

18 Oct.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. Chief G/SI				REL	
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
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SECRET

1/P-25

Publications Division, Projects Planning

21 October 1949

D/EC 25X1A

[Signature]

Tin and Antimony Mines in China - Project: 1P-25

In reply to your request of 19 October 1949, attached please find brief statements and tables covering geographical location and production of the principal tin and antimony mines in China.

Current production of individual mines is not available. Production comes largely from a few important properties and from hundreds of small mines operated under contract by primitive methods.

A copy of SR-27, World Tin Situation, is also enclosed.

Attachments

Rec'd & Del.

21 Oct. 49

SECRET